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Throughout the last two decades, entrepreneurship and startup companies have 
skyrocketed. Adding significant value to the economy, entrepreneurialism has immense 
power to spark technological and social change in the world. Given the importance of 
entrepreneurialism, this paper will use a data-driven approach to discover significant 
factors that influence founder and startup company success. Founding startups is growing 
easier and becoming more prominent, yet the failure rates of these companies continue to 
settle around 90%, leaving many companies without the chance to reach their potential and 
have their full impact. Using a new dataset I have collected, I analyze company and founder 
data from startup companies that have been founded by Claremont College’s alumni. I 
tracked all the venture-backable startup companies that have been founded by that 
Claremont Consortium alumni since 1970. Through this dataset, benchmarking visuals, 
and regression analysis, I searched for potential influential factors and patterns in this new 
dataset. A company’s revenue, employee count, and founder and employee educational 
background and occupational experience, all have significant correlations with a startup 
company’s overall success. The paper will demonstrate how in the startup world, bigger is 
not always better and how quality matters more than quantity. In order to have a successful 
startup company, founder experience in previous startup companies is vital. Additionally, 
the paper shows that startup companies should originally focus on revenue in their early 
stage and then shift their focus to keeping a lean team full of high-quality talent if they 





Since the dotcom boom in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, entrepreneurship has been 
one of the most popular buzz words in the American vernacular. It has become the dream 
job for many, and the number of entrepreneurs continues to rise every year in the US. 
Entrepreneurship has become the dream job for many, and the number of entrepreneurs 
continues to rise every year in the US. Entrepreneurship rates have been steadily increasing 
in the US for the last 20 years and it is estimated that over 534,000 new business are created 
every month in the US (Lestraundra, 2021). A study by Kauffman Entrepreneurs shows 
that as of 2018, 320 adults out of 100,000 are creating a new business each month (Fairlie, 
2019). Despite the myriads of studies that show that roughly 90% of startup companies end 
up failing, people are still flocking to this industry in hopes of being a part of the lucky 
10% (Patel, 2015). Entrepreneurship and startup companies have created the new modern 
day goldrush – a race to the top to become the lucky founder that makes it and finds the 
gold. Entrepreneurialism is clearly becoming a vital component to occupational progress 
and technological change in the modern world, and these trends are only showing signs of 
increasing. Despite the large amount of risk and likely failure involved in startup 
companies and entrepreneurship, it is easy to understand the appeal. One of the biggest 
draws to this kind of work is the monetary reward for success – over 60% of all the 
billionaires in the world achieved their wealth from entrepreneurship and their respective 
startup companies (Simovic, 2021). For the 10% of companies that do manage to push past 
failure, there is immense monetary rewards waiting for them. Many of the top market cap 
companies in the US were all venture-backable startup companies at some point. This 
possibility of success seems to frequently trump the reality and risks of inevitable failures 
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in this industry. Additionally, startups further draw people because of the flexibility and 
creativity involved with these companies. The appeal of working for yourself and the social 
clout that comes along with being an entrepreneur certainly continues to fuel the gold rush 
for entrepreneurialism that we are witnessing today.  
Entrepreneurialism, however, is not only beneficial to those who pursue it and succeed, 
but also for the rest of the world that uses the products and services that these companies 
eventually provide. The world of entrepreneurs helps provide myriads of jobs for the 
economy, helps create excitement around work and technological progress, relieves 
immense pressure off of the government to create more jobs, promotes social change, and 
spurs economic growth and the national income. The successful entrepreneurs of the past 
in the US have dramatically altered the lives of many by providing new products or offering 
new services. Startup companies can simplify human life, increase productivity, provide 
convivences never imaginable, and simply provide further enjoyable consumer products. 
There is an incredible amount of potential power for entrepreneurs, and many are 
“frequently thought of as national assets to be cultivated, motivated, and remunerated to 
the greatest possible extent” (Shobhit, 2021). Entrepreneurship clearly matters for those 
involved and those in the rest of the world as well. This means that figuring out how to 
increase this historical 10% success rate also matters. Increasing entrepreneurial success 
could lead to even further progress, change, and advancement in not just the US, but also 
the world. Entrepreneurialism matters, and the more successfully humans can create and 
found startup companies, the better.  
Despite the immense importance of entrepreneurship and startup culture, there exists a 
surprisingly small amount of research on why some of these companies end up being 
 7 
valued for billions of dollars while others hardly ever make it off the ground and fail. The 
success of these companies is largely contributed to timing or external factors, but there is 
still much to be researched as to what makes some founders achieve the billionaire status 
while others are never able to get their company off the ground. A gap exists in the industry 
for more data-driven discoveries and decisions.1 The industry of entrepreneurialism is an 
extremely important one, and one that has myriads of data points and companies to learn 
from and use to make more data-driven decisions. 
 In this paper I use a unique dataset of venture-backable startup companies created by 
7C alum to explore the potential factors that influence success or failure for founders and 
startup companies.2 Although the paper is only using data on companies founded by alum 
from these Claremont Colleges, as I will document, they have had unusual and impressive 
success in the entrepreneurship universe. These colleges are some of the top liberal arts 
colleges in the US and are primely located within close proximity to LA and Silicon Valley, 
two hubs for entrepreneurship and innovation. Although these findings should not 
necessarily dictate how founders found or how startup companies run, they may shed light 
 
1 First Round Capital, a venture capital firm that specializes in providing seed-
stage funding to startup technology companies, shares this sentiment and says that despite 
venture capitalists constantly telling entrepreneurs to invest in data-driven decisions, 
entrepreneurs as an industry have done a very poor job of doing it (First Round Capital, 
2015). 
2 Additionally, as a consequence of this paper, it will help expose students in the 7C 
community to the reality of the impressive startup community among the 7C network. 
Many students will leave the Claremont Colleges and go on to create incredible 
companies. This paper will help explore this topic to both inspire students with the 
plethora of alumni out in the world doing it already, while also potentially providing 
research on how to go do it best within the 7C universe. Finally, the paper will also 
explore the unique properties of the data set and give a picture of the individual school’s 
ecosystem as well as the entire community startup ecosystem while also benchmarking it 
against other universities. 
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on the current state of the industry as a whole and how to best succeed in its environment 
outside of these colleges as well. I will first briefly discuss the studies in the past on 
entrepreneurship success and failure. Then, I will go through the creation of my unique 
data set and summarize some of the interesting findings in the data. Additionally, the paper 
will also benchmark the 7C colleges against other top universities to put into perspective 
how applicable the findings from this paper are to the general startup universe. Finally, the 
paper will use regression analysis to show how factors like employee count, company 
revenue, college background, and past company experience can all impact startup success. 
The goal of this thesis is to use regression analysis to observe patterns and relationships for 
what might lead to success in the startup universe and to explore this new dataset, but not 
to claim any casual relationships. My results show that a startup company’s size does not 
necessarily matter for them to attain venture funding and grow successful. Rather than 
company size, the founder’s experience and educational background, along with the quality 
of hired employees appears to matter far more for company success. Additionally, the paper 
also demonstrates the impressive success of Claremont College alumni founders.  
II. Literature Review 
 
With some of the most prominent companies in the world to date coming from startup 
founders and companies, the search for the secretes to success have been heavily sought 
after. Until the last decade or so, however, there has not been sufficient data to fully analyze 
and accurately explore these potential factors and attributes that successful startup 
companies and founders share. Okrah (2018) explored some of these potential factors for 
success in startup companies and found that turnover, internal market openness, and 
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governmental policies were large driving factors for success in the startup world. Turnover, 
the percentage of return on investment in a year for the company, is an unsurprising 
impactful factor, considering that how much revenue these startup companies are able to 
generate is likely a large contributing factor to how long they can stay afloat and how much 
attention they draw from venture capitalists. This study shows, however, that outside of 
just being able to generate strong revenues and returns, these startup companies are also at 
the mercy of the market and government surrounding them – they are reliant on external 
factors. Market openness not only helps to breed innovation and competition, but it also 
helps draw more foreign investment opportunities as well, further contributing to the 
success of startups. Governmental policy is also shown to have an impact on the success 
of startups in this study, and the countries such as Singapore who have created government 
policies conducive to startups, have seen immense success in comparison to countries that 
have not (Okrah, 2018). This finding is similar to many other economists’ opinion like 
Kritikos (2014) who argues that “the benefits to society will be greater in economies where 
entrepreneurs can operate flexibly, develop their ideas, and reap the rewards.” 
Entrepreneurs will naturally move to environments with governments and policies that are 
more innovation-friendly whenever they have the opportunity. The Okrah study, however, 
did not analyze data at the startup company level and rather used proxies such as GDP in 
order to see the impact external factors had on startups. It did not look at specific company 
data, and the conclusions were largely external factors that founders cannot do much about. 
Factors like governmental policy and market timing are clearly shown to be important 
factors in success, but these variables are largely outside of founder’s control. This thesis 
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will build upon this literature by looking internally at company level data and finding 
internal contributing factors that founders and companies have more control over.  
Along with these external and market related success factors linked with startups, 
another study done by Bill Gross, the founder of Idealab, found that external market timing 
may be the most influential factor of all in determining a startup company’s success. After 
analyzing 200 different companies, Gross found that market timing was the single most 
influential factor and accounted for 42% of the difference between successes and failures 
among the companies he analyzed (Schroeder, 2019). Despite having the perfect team, the 
best idea, and a profitable revenue stream, all companies are still subject to their timing, 
and Gross suggests that market timing is the single most important factor that determines 
startup success. If the market and consumers are not convinced or ready to need their 
product or service, then the company will struggle regardless of its potential. The study 
helps shed some light on way many great companies with all-star teams are still not able 
to find success – the timing was not right. Furthermore, it helps explain some of the 
seemingly poorly constructed and founded companies that surprisingly manage to take off 
– the right product at the right time. Unfortunately, however, market timing is not always 
something within founder and company control. Additionally, this study only looked at 
200 companies, 100 of which Idealab had invested in, which could potentially have led to 
selection bias and skewed the results. By looking at 700 completely different startup 
companies over 50 years, my thesis will try to improve upon this study.  
Other studies have chosen to focus more on company specific and founder data that 
leads to success as opposed to these outside market and governmental influences. First 
Round Capital ran an analysis in 2015 with 300 companies and 600 founders in order to 
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shed some light on commonalities among their most success startup company investments 
over a ten-year period (First Round, 2015). The results of their study showed four main 
factors that seemed to influence success: female founders, age of founders, educational 
background, and job experience. Companies with at least one female founder had greater 
success in the study than ones without any – potentially alluding to a larger variable of 
company diversity as being impactful. Additionally, companies with younger founders 
who had top undergraduate degrees and past technology experience tended to produce the 
most success. Entrepreneurialism definitely seems to be an industry where past experience 
behooves founders, and the more experience the better. Another interesting result that came 
out from this study was the lack of significance of geographic location. Despite Silicon 
Valley being the known hub of innovation for the last few decades, First Round’s study 
suggests that geographic location may not matter as much as many assume it does – Silicon 
Valley is not a necessary location for a startup company to be successful. The observations 
that came out of this study are more in line with aspects of startups that can be controlled 
and adjusted for. My thesis will expound on some of these observations from the First 
Round study and search for more explanations for finding success in such a nebulous 
industry while also analyzing even more companies and trying to eliminate some of the 
selection bias from this study.  
While most studies focus on highlighting the keys to success for these startups, other 
research has also been done on the leading contributors to failures. Failory, a startup 
community of researchers, focusses its research on what it is that leads to startup company 
failures of the past. Falling in line with Gross’s conclusion, Failory also finds that the 
largest contributing factors to company failure is the lack of cohesion between the product 
 12 
and the market timing. Based off of myriads of founder failure interviews, the market and 
product timing along with financial problems and team chemistry contributed the most to 
noticeable failures (Cerdeira, 2021). Right product, but wrong timing seems to be a 
common ghost that haunts these failed startups. According to the study, the industry also 
plays a part in the failure rate of the company. Information, Transportation, and Utility 
companies tend to have the highest failure rates among all potential startup company 
industries (Cerdeira, 2021). If startups are considered to be business experiments, testing 
business and market assumptions as they develop, then these factors seem to contribute the 
largest to what makes these experiments fail. The study suggests that choosing the right 
timing and the right industry can be crucial in avoiding failure.  
Along with market timing, financial stability, and team chemistry, CBInsights also 
attributes the failure of many companies to their surrounding competition. After looking at 
over 300 failed venture capital backed startups, they concluded that competition from other 
companies lead to roughly 20% of company failures (CB Insights, 2020). These findings 
point to a key aspect of startup success – innovation and growth. The company may have 
the right product at the right time with the ideal team, but startups need to continually grow 
and innovate to not fall stagnant. Just because a startup may quickly be able to generate 
revenue and attract initial venture funding, does not mean that their path is set. New 
competition is constantly around the corner and these startups need to adapt and innovate 
constantly in order to have sustained success. Studying reasons and factors like these for 
failure and learning from the mistakes of the past, is just as powerful as studying successes 
and must be considered as well when thinking about how startup companies succeed. 
Regardless of what the exact contributor to these startup company failures, one thing is 
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clear: most of them fail. According to Thomas Astebro, empirical evidence for startup 
companies shows low median returns with extremely high variances. Most of the 
companies end up failing with almost no returns, while very few succeed (Astebro, 2014). 
Despite the low probability of success and the risk involved, however, the trends of 
entrepreneurship only continue to rise.  
Obviously, the factors of success and failure for startup companies and entrepreneurs 
are not a new topic to study, and it has been something people have been curious about for 
decades given the significance and monetary value of the industry. The majority of studies 
and research on this topic, however, have been on a small and widely varying data sets of 
companies. Picking and choosing which companies to look at in an infinite number of 
options can certainly lead to selection bias. Both studies done by First Round and Idealab 
included all companies that the venture firms had personally invested in; if these firms had 
already chosen these companies to invest in then there is certainly selection bias by only 
analyzing those companies. Additionally, if all startups out there is the scope of focus, there 
is an infinite amount of data out there to collect and try to apply findings to. Both the 
Idealab and First Round studies also only included 200 and 300 hundred companies 
respectively.  
The main contribution of my thesis to the literature is to use a novel data set that 
focusses on one large set of companies and founders all from the 7C network. By focusing 
in on this specific subset of companies, the study will be able to tap into a finite list of 
companies that is very representative of the entirety of companies and founders in this 7C 
universe. By focusing on this one finite set of companies, it could help unlock other keys 
to why some founders and companies are successful when others are not. Looking at this 
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dataset which contains a group of likely similar individuals, from similar colleges, with 
somewhat similar backgrounds, and within proximity to one another, will hopefully help 
to isolate the ways in which these founders and companies do differ and why some have 
succeeded and others have failed. Most of these founders are all coming from similar 
backgrounds and are equally set up for success coming out of these elite college, yet some 
fail and some succeed. This thesis will use this group to try to unlock some of the reasons 
for these differences. Additionally, the data set is not only a complete representation of a 
finite amount of 7C companies, but it also contains more companies and founders than 
most studies done in the past. With 700 different companies, the data set provides 
numerous observations to learn from. These findings could then provide new insights for 




In order to create this data set, I started by using the LinkedIn Sales Navigator function 
in order to search for any individuals with education background from any of the Claremont 
Colleges (Pomona, Harvey Mudd, Claremont McKenna, Scripps, Pitzer, CGU, and Keck) 
and with job titles consisting of CEO, Founder, or Co-Founder. Using these founder’s 
LinkedIn pages as well as their startup company’s LinkedIn page I then collected variables 
for the data set listed below. Using these company names, I also search and collected data 
from Crunchbase for the variables listed below. All the variables in the data set were 
collected from LinkedIn and Crunchbase and then entered manually into the tool Airtable. 
Airtable was used to collect the information and for some minimal data cleaning purposes. 
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The data set is a compilation of company and founder information on all 7C founded 
companies and founders. The data set has also been edited to only include startup 
companies that are potentially venture-backable. A list of the full set of variables and their 
source and description are listed in Appendix A.  
Despite the completeness of the data collection process, there are some potential 
problems. Because this data was manually collected in January 2021, it is not automatically 
updating, and the data found on LinkedIn and Crunchbase could be outdated. These two 
sources could also have their own errors and may not be completely accurate. In this 
manual creation there was also subjectivity involved in my determination of what is and is 
not a venture-backable company. This determination was made based on the past 
experience of the founder, and the type of company it was and what type of product or 
service they provided. Other potential problems could be that it still is an incomplete data 
set. Although it currently contains all 7C companies according to LinkedIn, there still could 
be some missing gaps in the specific 7C network – it is constrained to what LinkedIn has 
listed. 
This data set shows that despite being a small consortium of all liberal arts colleges, 
the Claremont Colleges are clearly a hub for entrepreneurialism, business, and startup 
companies. As shown in Figure 1, the data set contains almost 700 different companies 
dating all the way back to 1977 that have been founded by 7C alumni. Since 2011, over 35 
companies venture-backable companies have been founded by these alumni every single 
year. Pomona College, Harvey Mudd College, and Claremont McKenna College are 
leading the way with all over 100 companies founded throughout the schools’ existence 
(Table 1). Table 1 shows that the venture capital dollars raised along with the acquisition 
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dollars earned by companies in this data set accumulate to more than $31B and $12B 
respectively. Employing over 30,000 workers and over 500 7C alum employees as well, 
these companies make a compelling case for the Claremont Consortium to be considered a 
top tier landing spot for any student interested in startup and entrepreneurialism. The data 
set contains massive companies such as Cisco (current market cap of $206B), Avalara 
(with an IPO $1.4B), Cruise (acquired by GM for $1.2B and raised $7.3B), Juul (raised 
over $15B) and GitHub (acquired by Microsoft for $7.5B). 
Overall, the Claremont universe has over 230 different companies that have had some 
sort of venture raised capital, and over 190 companies that have raised over $1M in venture 
capital dollars (Figure 4). Over 100 of these companies have been acquired over the years 
and 9 of them have gone public and IPO’d. With almost 500 founders in the data set, these 
founders are comprised of almost 100 female founders, almost 50 student founders, and 
over 40 founders with known graduate degrees. The companies also have diversity in 
industry and geographic location. With companies in over 20 different industries, the 
Claremont Consortium seems to particularly specialize in E-Commerce, Biotech and 
FinTech companies (Figure 5). Over 60 companies in this data set have been founded 
outside of the United States, but among the over 600 companies founded with the States, 
San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York are among the leading cities (Figure 6).  
Claremont McKenna College: 
 
Figures 8, 9, and 10 show the data on companies founded by Claremont McKenna 
College (CMC) alum. Driven by one of the most impressive companies in the data set 
(Cruise), CMC alum have founded over 100 companies and raised almost $8.9B in venture 
capital dollars. Since 2013 they have consistently averaged over 5 companies founded a 
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year, and all of these companies have led to over $2.3B in acquisition exit dollars. The last 
four years the school has produced double digit amounts of venture-backable companies. 
These CMC companies combine for the second largest venture capital dollars raised of any 
of the other 7C’s, and they also have the largest amount of IPO’s in the data set with 
TrueCar, Avalara, and Limeade. They also have the third most female founders of any 
other 7C college with 14. Even if you take Cruise out of the data set, CMC will still have 
almost $2B in raised capital, the third highest in the 7C’s. Geographically, CMC founded 
companies are the most heavily concentrated in the Bay Area, Los Angeles, and New York. 
Additionally, E-Commerce and Fintech companies are the most popular industries among 
CMC founded companies, however they have an incredibly diverse array of industry 
representation. While Cruise is certainly the most impressive company from CMC, they 
also have 13 other companies that have raised between $1-$5M in venture capital and 9 
others that have raised $20-$50M.  
 
Harvey Mudd College 
 
Figures 11, 12, and 13 display data on the Harvey Mudd College (HMC) alum. 
HMC drives over 75% of the total 7C’s acquisition exit dollars with over $9B in acquisition 
– they have had 8 companies be acquired for over $100M. Additionally, the college is 
second in total companies founded with over 150 and second in total acquired companies 
with over 30. Despite only being the third largest college in terms of venture capital dollars 
raised, HMC still has over 55 companies that have acquired over $1M in venture capital 
and 10 companies that have acquired between $10-20M. HMC continues to produce more 
companies every year and since 2014, they have had double digit numbers of companies 
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founded. HMC’s breakdown of venture dollars is an even spread between Helix, GitHub, 
and Lanzatech all accounting for double-digit percentages of the school’s total venture 
capital. GitHub dominates all other companies in this dataset though with by far the largest 
acquisition dollar amount by Microsoft for $7.5B. These HMC companies are primarily 
located in the Bay Area, Los Angeles, San Diego; and their largest industries of expertise 
are Biotech and Security, Infrastructure, and Dev Ops. Additionally, HMC has the most 
amount of undergraduate founded companies with 17 and has two impressive IPO 




Figures 14, 15, and 16 shows that Pomona College leads all other 7C Colleges in 
total companies founded with over 240 and they also lead the way in number of founders 
with over 160, 29 of which are female founders. Pomona also boasts the highest amount of 
capital dollars raised in total with over $18B. Since 2010, Pomona alum have founded at 
least 10 new companies every single year, and these companies have raised over $18B in 
venture capital. Juul, Samumed, and Zwift are the three largest companies in Pomona’s 
universe in capital dollars raised. Pomona also has 27 total companies that have acquired 
between $1-$20M in venture capital. Similar to CMC, Pomona’s 240+ companies are 
concentrated in the Bay Area, Los Angeles, and New York. Health & Wellness, Fintech, 
and Media & Advertising are the largest three industries for Pomona. Within the Pomona 




Pitzer & Scripps College 
 
Figures 17, 18, and 19 show how these two schools combined contribute over 
$500M in venture capital dollars raised as well as over 10 companies that have individually 
raised over $1M in capital. Together, their alumni have founded over 90 companies. 
DAQRI, founded by a Scripps alum, is the largest contributor for venture dollars; while 
Aduro Biotech, a Pitzer founded company, is the largest contributor for exit dollars. E-
Commerce and Information Tech & Data Analytics are the two largest industries for these 
schools, and the companies are primarily located in the Bay Area and Los Angeles. Pitzer 
has a strong New York presence and has also had two impressive IPO’s – Marchex and 
Aduro Biotech. Scripps also has two companies, Hixme and Velocidi, that have acquired 
between $10-$50M in venture capital.  
 
Claremont Graduate & Keck University 
 
Figures 20, 21, and 22 show that combined, the graduate schools have over 90 
companies founded and over $450M in venture capital dollars. In total, both schools have 
19 companies with over $1M in venture capital, and Keck has 2 companies that have raised 
over $100M in venture capital including Nurep with over $120M. Homology Medicines 
and Nurep are driving the majority of the venture dollars for these two schools. The 
companies for these schools are primarily located in the Bay Area and Los Angeles with a 
strong international presence as well. CGU specializes in Info Technology & Data 
Analytics as well as Healthcare & Wellness; Keck specializes in Biotech. Keck and CGU 
have also had two large IPOs with Cisco and Homology Medicines.  
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Comparing the 7C’s with Top US Universities 
 
While all of the 7C data in this dataset is impressive on its own merit, the data is even 
more impressive when you put it in comparison with the other top schools across the 
country. In order to benchmark the Claremont Consortium data against other top 
universities I used the Pitchbook 2019 report to obtain venture capital amounts from other 
universities. This report tracked venture capital dollars raised by universities from the time 
period of January 1st 2006 – July 1st 2019 (Pitchbook, 2019). Using this report data, I then 
benchmarked the total Claremont Consortium numbers and ranked these top universities 
to put into perspective how impressive this 7C universe is. Tables 2 and 3 show that not 
only is the Claremont Consortium ranked 4th in raw capital raised during this 12-year 
period, but they are also ranked 1st by a magnitude of more than 3 in capital raised per 
company.  
IV. Empirical Analysis  
 
Using the dataset compiled, this paper explores four types of cross sectional OLS 
regressions. All four of the regressions will use the same control variables but explore 
different outcome variables labeled Yi. The regression framework is the same in each 
regression, but with different outcome variable that try to measure a company’s success. 
Regression Framework: 
Yi = β0+ β1EmployeeCounti + β27CEmployeeCounti + β3Revenuei + β4StudentFounderi + 
β5FemaleFounderi + β6SerialFounderi + β7GraduateFounderi + β8YearFoundedi + 
β9Schooli + β10Industryi + β11Regioni + ui 
 
The first regression will explore the contributing factors to the probability of companies 
being able to raise venture capital or not as a proxy for company success. A variable called 
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Venture Dollars was created as a dummy for whether or not a company has ever raised any 
venture capital in its history, and the regression will use the VentureDollars variable as the 
outcome variable in the first regression. This regression will try to uncover what influences 
the probability of companies being able to raise funding. The second regression will look 
at the contributing factors to the amount of venture capital that all companies have raised 
as another potential proxy for success. The outcome variable in this regression will be the 
amount of capital that each company has raised, and the regression will use all of the 
observations. The regression analysis will help shed light on potential contributing factors 
for why some companies are able to raise more venture capital dollars than other 
companies. The third regression is similar to this regression but will only look at a 
subsection of the companies conditional on raising a positive amount of capital. This will 
explore the factors, conditional on a company raising any amount of capital, that contribute 
to some companies raising larger amounts than others. The final regression will look at 
contributing factors to what influences the lifespan of companies. Failure and success rates 
are an important variable to track in startup companies due to the excessive amounts of 
failed companies. I created a variable called 5YearsAlive that is a dummy variable for 
whether the company managed to stay open for 5 years or more. This regression will use 
this variable as the outcome variable and try to uncover what influences the probability of 
companies being able to stay in business longer than the typical company. 
Although there may be slight endogeneity involved specifically between the capital 
raised outcome variables and the employee count control variables, it is not a huge concern. 
The amount of venture capital that a startup company raises could theoretically allow them 
to hire and employee more employees leading to some reverse causality issues. Most 
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startup companies, however, put their venture dollars to use in the form of R&D and 
product/service development rather than simply hiring more employees, so this is not a 
major concern with this study. Furthermore, I do not claim any casual relationships 
between the variables of interest in this thesis. Instead, my aim in this thesis is more modest 
and simply to explore the correlations and relationships among variables to help explain 
some of the potential reasons for why certain companies experience more success and go 
on to raise more capital, generate positive revenues, get acquired, or even go public. Table 
4 shows the four main regression results that will be discussed further in the results section 




Bigger Isn’t Always Better: Revenue, Employee Count, & 7C Employees 
 
“Go big or go home.” We’ve all heard these words – it’s been codified as truth in 
our subconscious. Bigger houses, bigger paychecks, bigger cars, a bigger lawn than your 
neighbors – bigger is always better. If you are looking to raise venture capital, however, 
bigger may not always be better when it comes to company size. The quality and network 
affinity of the hired employees appears to matter much more than bigger number of 
employees.  
Using a combination of company employee count, and company revenue as a proxy 
for company’s size, I peeked under the hood to see if bigger is actually better. Do bigger 
companies with more employees and higher revenues lead to more attraction of venture 
dollars? My initial hypothesis was that the bigger the company was, the more likely it 
would be to attract and raise more venture capital. A company with a large number of 
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employees and a healthy amount of revenue would seemingly have an easier time acquiring 
more venture dollars from funders. While within the startup world many companies may 
punt on focusing on revenue, one would think that a startup with a strong employee count 
and healthy revenues would be an easier sell to potential investors. The data, however, 
suggests an interesting story.  
To first begin looking at what factors contribute to startup companies’ success, I 
looked at what variables appear to be significantly correlated with the probability of 
whether a company acquired venture dollars. One of the essential goals of any startup is to 
obtain venture capital funding, and this funding is often a key to success for the startup 
company to be able to continue and eventually become profitable. Because of this, in 
Column 1 of Table 4, I regressed independent variables against a dependent variable of 
whether the company has ever attained venture dollars as a proxy for startup success.  
While controlling for the different industries of the startup companies, the 
geographical locations, and the biographical founder information, this regression helps 
isolate the potential impact that Employee Count, 7C Employee Count, and Company 
Revenue has on whether a company is able to attain startup founding. Initially in this 
regression, Company Revenue is the only factor of those three company specific variables 
that is statistically significant at the 10% level, while the impact of Employees and 7C 
Employees seems negligible. This matched my initial hypothesis because whether or not a 
startup is able to start generating profitable revenue is a strong initial signal to potential 
investors. This regression, however, does not allow these variables to impact to magnitude 
of venture dollars raised. While revenue may be statistically significant in the probability 
of whether funding is raised or not, I also wanted to see what variables influenced the 
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amount of venture dollars that were raised which led to the regression in Column 3 of Table 
4. Although raising venture dollars is a strong sign for a successful startup, the amount of 
capital raised also matters in company success. There is a large difference between a 
company that raises a couple hundred thousand and a couple million. Company success 
does not just look like simply raising capital – the amount also matters. Using the same set 
of control variables, but this time regressing on the amount of venture dollars that 
companies raised and conditional on the companies that raised any amount of capital at all, 
this regression showed more interesting results. 
Once I conditioned on the 243 companies that had raised capital in the data, 
company revenue clearly is not significantly correlated with larger amount of venture 
capital. For a variable that intuitively would seem extremely correlated with generating 
more venture dollars and that was significantly correlated with objectively raising capital, 
company revenue does not seem to have an impact on the amount of venture raised. This 
could be due to the fact that early seed startup companies care far more about growth than 
positive revenue and because many of the companies tend to use venture dollars to fund 
their company rather than internally generated revenue in the beginning. Additionally, this 
could be because the potential founders care more about the founding team and the 
company’s mission, product, and future growth rather than its current positive revenue. 
Funding invested in these companies appears to be based more on belief in future growth 
rather than current generating revenue. While company revenue is likely one of the best 
indications of whether or not the company will be able to get their foot in the door and raise 
initial capital, it does not appear to help the company generate more venture down the road. 
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Company revenue may matter at the beginning of a startup’s tenure, but if the company 
wants to continue to grow and raise capital, other variables appear to matter more.  
The strong and statistically significant negative correlation between employee 
count and venture dollars is a particularly strange observation. This would appear to 
suggest that the larger a company is and the more employees it has on its payroll, the harder 
it is to attain venture dollars. Since we are controlling for company revenue as well, this 
could be because founders are likely more apprehensive to invest in companies with a 
larger number of employees on their payroll if their revenue is not also proportionally 
greater as well – too many mouths to feed without ample food. Additionally, this could 
also be because more employees are detrimental to early-stage startup companies which 
need to be lean and adapt quickly as they begin to develop their company and product or 
service. Larger employee numbers could potentially be a hinderance to these startups as it 
could slow down growth and hinder swift adaptation.  
The most surprising observation from Column 3 of Table 4 is that despite overall 
employee count having a negative correlation with venture dollars, 7C employee count 
appears to have a strong positive and statistically significant correlation with venture 
dollars. This correlation could point to 7C alum’s particular network to the VC community 
as well as their talent and skill set. The 7C’s certainly are known for attracting top-notch 
students and the colleges are continuously ranked among the top universities. It certainly 
suggests that the Claremont Colleges produces successful alum and startup employees. As 
opposed to having a large number of employees that could lead to too many mouths to feed 
and slow down adaptability and growth, having a large concentration of employees from 
top schools appears to lead to a healthier amount of venture capital funding. This finding 
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falls in line with First Round Capital’s previous analysis that showed how import strong 
education backgrounds are for founders and employees at successful startups.  
Company revenue’s insignificance, employee count’s negative correlations, and 7C 
employee count’s positive correlation continue similar trends when we consider another 
type of startup company success. Outside of trying to raise venture capital dollars, another 
obviously goal of any startup company is to simply stay alive and beat the 90% average 
failure rate (Patel, 2015). While using the same control variables but regressing them on 
whether the company stayed alive for at least 5 years without having to shut its doors, 
similar results emerged in Column 4 of Table 4. 
Again, company revenue does not appear to be correlated with a company’s 
probabilistic success in staying alive for at least 5 years. 7C employee count, however, 
again is strongly positively correlated with a company’s probability of success in staying 
alive while overall employee count is negatively correlated with the probability of a 
company staying alive for at least 5 years. The trends of these three variables continues if 
the control variables are regressed on whether or not a company has been alive for at least 
10 years. Between all these regressions the same story holds – bigger might not always be 
better.  
Company revenue matters, but only to a certain extent. While it might be an initial 
attraction to founders to have high revenues, if a startup company wants to continue to earn 
more venture dollars, have sustained success, and keep their doors open to beat the 10% 
odds, company revenue shows to matter less and less. Additionally, having a smaller and 
leaner company size is potentially far more beneficial and conducive to company success. 
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Quality matters more than quantity, and the quality of the employees and their affinity 
network will pay dividends for a company’s success.  
In conclusion, bigger just might not always be better to acquire more venture capital 
dollars. Better might look like keeping your startup as nice and lean as possible while 
stacking it with A-class talent – talent like you find at the 7C’s and other top universities. 
A company’s size (their revenue and employee count) may not matter as much as people 
think – in order to have a successful startup company, who the founder is and who the 
employees are appears to matter much more than how much revenue or how many 
employees the company has.  
 
Quality Over Quantity: Serial Founders & College Background 
 
Few would argue that creating your own company is one of the most challenging 
career ventures somebody could set out on – incredibly rewarding, but still very 
challenging. Because of the nature of the difficulty of creating a success startup company, 
research shows that who the founder is has significant impact on how successful the 
company will become. In the previous section, the regressions helped highlight the 
significance of employee background and their previous educational experience. Similarly, 
demographic information on the founders also appears to be statistically significantly 
correlated with company success in the previous regressions. Column 1 of Table 4 further 
shows that student founders of companies are far less likely to obtain venture funding as 
opposed to founders who have already graduated. This result should not come as a surprise. 
First Round Capital in their analysis showed in depth how much a founder’s career 
experience and background mattered for startup success. Their analysis showed how 
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founders coming from top companies and founders that had graduated from top universities 
often found the most success. In a similar vein, college students who have not had the 
career experience appear to struggle obtaining venture capital and being a student founder 
appears to lower the company’s probability of obtaining venture capital by 15%. Across 
all the different regressions, student founder continues to be a negative factor that lowers 
the probability of obtaining venture dollars and the company’s lifespan.  
Another variable that seems to have a significant impact on a company’s ability to 
raise more venture capital dollars is whether the founder is a serial founder. This variable 
might be the best proxy for past experience among founders because this variable controls 
for if the specific founder has founded a company before. Conditional on all of the 
companies that have raised capital in Column 3 of Table 4, having a company with a serial 
founder appears to significantly increase the amount of capital raised at the 5% level. 
Again, this finding is along similar lines to what First Round Capital found in their analysis 
– past career and educational backgrounds do indeed significantly contribute to founder 
success. Contrary to the results found in their analysis, however, none of these regressions 
point to female founders having a significant effect on company success. In all of the 
regressions, companies with a female founder are not shown to have a higher probability 
of raising capital or staying alive longer nor are they shown to significantly affect the 
amount of capital raised. According to this dataset, whether the founder is a male and 
female does not significantly impact the company’s success.  
Another biographical founder variable that does appear to impact the company’s 
success in raising venture dollars and staying alive for longer than 5 years is the school that 
the founder attended. Using all the same control variables, but focusing in on the school 
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specific impact, a few schools rise to the top in terms of venture funding success in Column 
1 of Table 4. Both Claremont McKenna and Harvey Mudd College are shown to have 
strong statistical significance in increasing the probability of obtaining venture funds. Both 
these schools are the only two schools in the dataset shown to be statistically significant in 
increasing the probability of obtaining venture. Harvey Mudd and CMC are known to be 
engineer, finance, and econ powerhouses, and these schools seem to leave an impact on the 
alumni’s future success in entrepreneurship.  
In conclusion, who you are as a founder can have significant impacts on how 
successful your startup company is. Past career experience and in particular experience 
with past startup companies can significantly increase the probability of raising capital as 
well as the amount of capital raised. Additionally, inexperienced student founders lead to 
a lower probability of obtaining venture funds. Past educational backgrounds also has 
importance, and the school that the founder comes from appears to affect the company’s 
potential success as well. Overall, the quality and experience of the founder is a very 
important factor to startup success.  
Discussion 
 
Overall, throughout all the regressions, similar patterns and stories emerged. In the 
initial stages of a startup company, having higher revenues seems to be correlated with a 
higher likelihood of obtaining funding. The company’s revenue appears to be a significant 
factor in the initial raising of venture funding, and this is likely due to the fact that it serves 
as a signal to potential investors that the company has a profitable and potentially 
successful business model and product or service. After the initial capturing of some 
amount of funding, however, revenue appears to become insignificant in how it impacts 
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the amount of funding raised and the lifespan of the company. Conditional on companies 
that have raised venture capital, revenue does not significantly impact the amount to which 
the companies raise. Additionally, a company’s revenue does not significantly impact the 
extent to which the company remains alive with its doors open. This observation suggests 
that having a startup with profitable revenues may help in the initial phase of a startup, but 
it is certainly not the golden ticket if the company wants to have sustained success, raise 
funding down the road, and continue to avoid company closure.  
A company’s employee count does, however, appear to have potential impacts on 
a company’s ability to raise funding and keep its business alive longer. While the employee 
count does not appear to be statistically correlated with a company’s probability of raising 
funding or not; conditional on a company raising capital, it does have a negative impact on 
how much venture capital is raised and the probability of staying alive. Higher employee 
counts lead to less funding raised conditional on raising funding and also leads to a higher 
probability of company closure. This observation suggests that startup companies may be 
at a disadvantage if they grow too fast. If a startup company wants to have sustained 
success, having a leaner company size may serve them better so that they can adapt quicker 
and be more agile as a company. 
The company’s count of 7C alumni employees appears to work in the opposite way 
to raw employee counts. Although the amount of 7C employees at a company does not 
significantly impact the probability of raising funding, higher 7C employee counts does 
appear to be strongly positively correlated with the amount of funding conditional on the 
company raising funding. This observation suggests that the quality of employees you hire, 
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and their affinity network and education background definitely matter; especially in startup 
companies where the overall employee count is generally smaller.  
Of the top 15 companies that have hired the most 7C employees, there are 10 
companies that remain private, 3 companies that have reached unicorn status at one point, 
2 companies that have gone public with over $420B market caps in total, 2 companies that 
got acquired for over $8.5B in total, and only one company that eventually closed (Table 
5). In total these 15 companies also raised over $23.5B in venture capital. 7C employees 
and quality employees from strong universities certainly seem to have important impacts 
on startup success.  
Across all results, founder career and educational background along with past 
venture experience also showed to be impactful. In every regression being a student 
founder showed to negatively impact the probability and the amount of raising capital while 
also increasing the probability of company failure. While being an experienced student 
founder showed adverse results, the experience gained from these student founders is 
important. While student founders lead to negative company outcomes, being an 
experienced serial founder positively impacted the amount of venture dollars that 
companies raised. These observations suggest that past experience with startup companies 
is vital if founders want to increase their chances of success. So, while student founders 
may not experience the most success, these experiences as students are still important in 
contributing to experience that could lead to greater success down the road. Two of the 
most impressive companies in the dataset, Juul and Pax Labs, both came from a serial 
founder and overall, eight different companies that were founded by serial founders all 
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raised at least over $1M and combined for raising over $15.6B in venture capital funding 
(Table 6). 
While experience clearly matters for founder success, their educational background 
also seems to have an impact on their probability of raising venture capital. Claremont 
McKenna College and Harvey Mudd both lead the charge for the schools that lead to the 
highest probability of raising capital. These results suggest that where a founder goes to 
school does have an impact on their probability and likelihood of raising venture in the 
future. This could potentially be attributed to the fact that some schools lead to better 
networks and affinity groups to draw on for funding. Additionally, the schools that 
emphasize engineering, finance, and economic majors seem to lead to the most 
entrepreneurial success. Educational background, connections and networks matter heavily 
in venture capital and the network and experience a potential founder acquires from their 
college could seriously impact their future startup company.  
Based off of these results, founders of future startups need to understand the importance 
that experience has on success. For many founders, it takes numerous tries at 
entrepreneurialism before achieving success – the more experiences at starting companies 
the better. Even though the first time an undergraduate founder may not notice immediate 
success, those unsuccessful experiences help lead to future success. Additionally, the 
founder’s choice of educational background matters. Thinking critically about where to 
attend undergrade or graduate colleges can have lasting impacts on a future founder’s 
affinity group, network, and eventual entrepreneurial success. Furthermore, these results 
should also influence the way that founders approach the importance of revenue generation 
in their startup companies. Revenue is important in the beginning stages for startup 
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companies in order to gain traction, fund innovation, and spark publicity and excitement 
among funders. Once venture capital funding has been acquired, however, founders need 
to think critically about how to continue to adapt. Rather than continuing to focus on 
revenue and company size, the data shows that focusing more on keeping the company 
lean and developing quality employees pays more dividends in the future. Founders should 
continuously gain experiences, grow their networks, build early revenue, choose their 
employees wisely, and keep their company lean.  
V. Conclusion 
 
The Claremont Colleges may be a small selection of liberal arts colleges that are 
relatively unknown in the space of venture capital and startup entrepreneurship, however, 
this paper sheds some light on the impressiveness of this consortium. With 700 companies 
tracked over 40+ years, $31B in total venture capital, $12.6B in acquisitional dollars, 9 
public companies, 110 acquired companies, and an incredibly diverse array of industries, 
founders, and locations, this consortium is a relatively unknown hub of entrepreneurship. 
The Consortium as a whole ranks 4th across all universities in the U.S. on a raw venture 
capital basis and 1st on a venture capital per company basis. Although this study may use 
data from a small subsection of the overall startup universe, I have gathered very rich and 
complete data on this impressive 7C universe, and I firmly believe that the takeaways from 
these studies are largely applicable to the broader startup world because of the prevalence 
of this Consortium. 
Potential avenues for further research would be to analyze what the ideal amount, if 
any, of attained venture capital funds is along with the impact of female founders. Little 
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research currently exists that tries to quantify the ideal amount of venture capital dollars 
for startup companies that want to go public and get acquired down the road; a study to try 
to find what that amount might be could lead to impactful results. Furthermore, numerous 
studies in the past have highlighted the impact that female founders can have on startup 
companies, and a deeper dive into the female founded companies in this dataset could 
uncover interesting results. Additionally, although this paper looked at the different 
impacts schools among the 7C Colleges have, further research on what universities 
throughout the U.S. lead to the most entrepreneurial success and then comparing them to 
the Claremont Consortium, could give a more complete picture of how colleges lead to 
entrepreneurial success. All of these arears of further research could continue to help 
uncover this mysterious world of entrepreneurialism.  
Despite the startup world and the entrepreneurship career seeming somewhat nebulous 
and incredibly risky and unpredictable, it does seem like there are some generally 
applicable keys to follow that tend to lead to success in this space that can be taken away 
from this thesis. In the beginning stages of any startup company, being able to generate 
strong and profitable revenues seems to be a strong indicator of likely being able to obtain 
venture capital funding. Startups thrive and often times largely function because of their 
generated venture capital, so making revenue a company goal in the early stages of a startup 
might pay dividends down the road. If a company wants to have sustained success though 
and push past the first line of venture funding, other factors come into play. Although a 
company’s revenue may help generate the initial venture capital funds, it does not appear 
to positively influence further generation of capital or the company’s tenure span. 
Likewise, a company employee count and size, actually shows to be detrimental in a 
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company’s success. In the later stages of startup companies, revenue and company size do 
not appear to matter and could be more harmful than helpful. In order to have a longer-
term successful startup company, quality starts to matter far more than quantity. At the end 
of the day, funders want to invest in people they trust, and the type of founder and the types 
of company employees matter immensely. Factors like previous startup experience and 
strong educational backgrounds appear to positively increase the likelihood of success for 
startup companies. Bigger is not always better, and quality over quantity seem to be two 
keys to keep in mind if you want to be a successful entrepreneur.   
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Table 1. School Specific Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables CGU CMC HMC Keck PI PO SC Total 
Total Companies 64 108 159 29 71 247 18 696 
Private Companies 30 79 99 15 40 116 13 392 
Closed Companies 21 13 28 11 22 88 5 188 
Acquired Companies 13 15 31 2 7 43 0 111 
Public Companies 1 3 2 1 2 0 0 9 
Founders 43 83 116 26 54 163 16 501 
Female Founders 9 15 12 7 11 29 16 99 
Student Founders 1 2 18 4 7 12 3 47 
Funding Rounds 32 174 250 24 35 236 13 764 
Total Capital Raised $116M $8.9B $2.6B $354M $279M $18.3B $333M $31B 
Acquisition Dollars $0 $2.3B $9.8B $0 $0 $569M $0 $12B 
Money Raised at IPOs $224M $350M $211M $144M $145M $0 $0 $1B 
Total Public Market Cap $206B $13B $3B $446M $118M $0 $0 $223B 
Employees 92636 12770 11735 686 647 6626 125 125225 
7C Employees 67 115 152 12 46 153 11 556 
Companies w/ > $1M 
Capital 15 43 62 5 7 64 4 200 
Companies w/ > $10M 
Capital 4 23 42 4 5 32 4 114 
Companies w/ > $100M 




















Table 2. Benchmarking: Top Schools by Capital Raised 
 
University Entrepreneurs Companies Capital ($B) Rank 
Claremont Colleges 202 189 $25.99 4 
Stanford University 1288 1114 $37.82 1 
Harvard University 987 882 $32.65 2 
University of California, 
Berkeley 1235 1103 $28.61 3 
MIT 1012 881 $25.56 5 
Cornell University 796 735 $23.86 6 
University of Pennsylvania 910 828 $17.83 7 
University of Michigan 745 670 $15.22 8 
Brown University 481 441 $13.95 9 







Table 3. Benchmarking: Top Schools by Capital per Company 
 
University Entrepreneurs Companies Capital ($B) Capital per Company ($B) Rank 
Claremont Colleges 202 189 $25.99 $0.138 1 
Harvard University 987 882 $32.65 $0.037 3 
Stanford University 1288 1114 $37.82 $0.034 4 
UCSB 274 256 $8.51 $0.033 5 
Cornell University 796 735 $23.86 $0.032 6 
Brown University 481 441 $13.95 $0.032 7 
University of 
Waterloo 433 339 $10.63 $0.031 8 
Boston University 327 315 $9.57 $0.030 9 
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CGU Dummy Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Region Dummies Included Included Included Included 
         
Number of 
Observations 696 696 243 696 
R-Squared 0.1826 0.2195 0.3937 0.1988 
F  Stat 1.54 1.94 1.84 1.71 
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Table 5. Companies w/ the Most 7C Employees 
 
Company 
Name Status Number of 7C Employees Capital Raised 
Acquisition 
Dollars 
Cisco Public 34 $2,500,000   
Cruise Acquired 17 $736,800,000 $1,250,000,000 
Mavenlink Private 7 $111,500,000   
LaunchDarkly Private 6 $130,300,000   
GovPredict Private 6 $240,000   
DreamHost Private 6 $48,000,000   
Apptentive Private 6 $17,515,000   
Playco Private 4 $100,000,000   
NOCD Private 4 $17,000,000   
Juul Private 4 $15,100,000,000   
Glass Media Private 4 $60,000   
GitHub Acquired 4 $350,000,000 $7,500,000,000 
Doximity Private 4 $81,800,000   
Clef Closed 4 $3,100,000   




Table 6. Serial Founded Companies 
 
Company Name Capital Raised 
Juul $15,100,000,000  
PAX Labs $541,700,000 
Enlibrium $15,000,000 















Figure 1. 7C: Total Companies Founded by Year 
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Figure 2. 7C: Total Exit Dollars by Exit Year 
Figure 3. 7C: Total Acquisition Dollars by Exit Year 
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Figure 4. 7C: Current Number of Private Companies w/ Venture Capital of $1M+ 
Figure 5. 7C: Number of Companies by Industry 
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Figure 6. 7C: Number of Companies by Top U.S. Cities 
Figure 7. 7C: Top 10 Companies by Capital Raised and Exit Dollars 
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Figure 8. CMC: Total Companies Founded by Year 
Figure 9. CMC: Number of Companies by Industry & City 
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Figure 10. CMC: Top 10 Companies by Capital Raised and Exit Dollars 
Figure 11. HMC: Total Companies Founded by Year 
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Figure 12. HMC: Number of Companies by Industry & City 
Figure 13. HMC: Top 10 Companies by Capital Raised and Exit Dollars 
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Figure 14. PO: Total Companies Founded by Year 
Figure 15. PO: Number of Companies by Industry & City 
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Figure 16. PO: Top 10 Companies by Capital Raised and Exit Dollars 
Figure 17. PI/SC: Total Companies Founded by Year 
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Figure 18. PI/SC: Number of Companies by Industry & City 
Figure 19. PI/SC: Top 10 Companies by Capital Raised  
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Figure 20. Keck/CGU: Total Companies Founded by Year 
Figure 21. Keck/CGU: Number of Companies by Industry & City 
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Appendix A. List of Variables and Descriptions 
 
Variable Name Description Source 
Company Name The company name of the 
7C founded startup 
LinkedIn 
Company Description The company written 
description 
LinkedIn 
Founder Name The name of the 7C 
founder 
LinkedIn 
School The 7C college that the 
founder attended 
LinkedIn 
Industry The sector and industry 
tags 
Crunchbase 
City The city the company is in LinkedIn 
State The state the company is in LinkedIn 
Region The U.S. locational region 
that the company is in or 
the country the company is 
in if outside the U.S, 
LinkedIn 
Date Founded The official start date of 
the company 
LinkedIn 
Status Whether the company is 
private, public, acquired, 
or closed 
Crunchbase 
Year Founded The year the company was 
founded in 
LinkedIn 
Year Closed The year the company 
closed if they did 
LinkedIn 
Latest Financing The latest round of 
financing that the company 
finished 
Crunchbase 
Funding Rounds How many, if any, rounds 
of funding the company 
went through 
Crunchbase 
Total Capital Raised Dollar amount of venture 
capital funds that the 
company has raised 
Crunchbase 
Year of First Funding The year that the company 
first received funding 
Crunchbase 
Exit Dollars The dollars amount that the 
company got acquired for 
or IPO’d for if they did 
Crunchbase 
 55 
Acquirer  The name of the acquiring 
company if any 
Crunchbase 
Exit Date The date the company got 
acquired or IPO’d 
LinkedIn, Crunchbase 
Employees The number of employees 
at the company 
LinkedIn 
7C Employees The number of 7C 
employees at the company 
LinkedIn 
Revenue The company’s average 
revenue from the range 
listed 
Crunchbase 
Long Description The company description 
from Crunchbase 
Crunchbase 
First Funding Date The date the first amount of 
funding was received 
Crunchbase 
SF If the company was 
founded by a student 
LinkedIn 
FF If the company was 
founded by a female 
LinkedIn 
Software If the company is classified 
as a software company 
Crunchbase 
Hardware If the company is classified 
as a hardware company 
Crunchbase 
Serial Founder If the company’s founder 
has started multiple 
companies who have raised 
venture funds 
Calculation 
Unicorn If the company is private 
and has an estimated 
valuation of at least $1B 
Crunchbase 
Undergrad Major The founder’s undergrad 
major if listed 
LinkedIn 
Grad School Whether or not the founder 
went to grad school 
LinkedIn 
Grad Degree 1 & 2 The founder’s grad level 
degrees if any 
LinkedIn 
Money Raised at IPO 
 
The amount of money the 
company raised at IPO 
Crunchbase 
Evaluation at time of IPO 
 
The estimated value of the 
company at IPO 
Crunchbase 
Current Market Value of 
Public Company 
The current market value 
of a public company 
Crunchbase 
Venture Dollars A dummy variable if the 




5 Years Alive A dummy variable if the 
company stayed open for at 


























Appendix C. 7C: Historic IPOs, $100M Acquisitions, & Unicorn Events by Year 
